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Abstract—Linux containers have risen in popularity in the last 
few years, making their way to commercial IT service offerings 
(such as PaaS), application deployments, and Continuous 
Delivery/Integration pipelines within various development teams. 
Along with the wide adoption of Docker, security vulnerabilities 
and concerns have also surfaced. In this survey, we examine the 
state of security for the most popular container system at the 
moment: Docker. We will also look into its origins stemming from 
the Linux technologies built into the OS itself; examine intrinsic 
vulnerabilities, such as the Docker Image implementation; and 
provide an analysis of current tools and modern methodologies 
used in the field to evaluate and enhance its security. For each 
section, we pinpoint metrics of interest, as they have been revealed 
by researchers and experts in the domain and summarize their 
findings to paint a holistic picture of the efforts behind those 
findings. Lastly, we look at tools utilized in the industry to 
streamline Docker security scanning and analytics which provide 
built-in aggregation of key metrics. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Docker containers have become an integral part of modern 
information technology (IT) infrastructure. They are used in 
combination with, or as a replacement of, traditional Virtual 
Machines (VM), offering a service or application that is lighter 
on resources yet still isolated from other services on the same 
system (or VM) The rapid expansion of this new technology 
also leads to an entirely new and different attack surface 
compared to application infrastructure and architectures used 
just a decade ago. Tripwire, a leading software vendor in the IT 
security and compliance area, performed a “State of Container 
Security Report” in 2019 that focused on surveying over 300 IT 
professionals working at companies with over 100 employees. 
These 300 professionals were directly responsible for 
maintaining environments with containers and it was reported 
that 94% of the respondents claimed to be concerned about 
container security, and 60% had a container security incident in 
the last year [1]. Additionally, managing the unique security 
situations created by Docker is important not only because 
security professionals are concerned about application security, 
but it is also crucial to understand as Docker powers some of 
the world’s largest companies such as AT&T, Netflix, Adobe, 
and PayPal [2]. 
In this paper, we focus specifically on the security concerns 
surrounding Docker and aim to provide the reader with an 
overview of the current state of affairs in this domain. We 
explore research from various academic bodies and technical 
conferences around the world, leveraging their findings to 
provide a complete picture of the most important security 
aspects and metrics.  
First, we provide the necessary background for 
understanding how Docker emerged from LXC (Linux 
Container), and how both rely on the Linux kernel. Then we 
systematically analyze security concerns, Docker images, and 
security prevention techniques via static and dynamic analysis 
methods. Finally, industry-leading tools and automation 
services that help with constant monitoring and guarding 
against exploitation attempts are introduced. 
Based on these methods of Docker security analysis, we 
have determined that Dockers relatively new yet widespread 
adoption leaves opportunity for security evaluation. Metrics 
derived from CPU, network, and memory statics provide a great 
start for anomaly detection techniques. However, Dockers 
unique infrastructure, including how it sits on top of a host 
operating system, means that there are some unique security 
implications that require custom tooling and new methods of 
analysis to ensure that results are actionable and monitorable.  
II. DOCKER AND ARCHITECTURAL SECURITY 
A. Linux Security Overview 
At its core, a Docker image is a tightly packaged 
GNU/Linux kernel, with all the necessary libraries and utilities 
needed to run the application in question (e.g. MySQL database 
instance). In such, it is important to examine the state of Linux 
security and understand the technologies that safeguard the host 
operating system from malicious attacks before diving into the 
Docker specifics. 
The basic, although outdated, security features of the Linux 
kernel are inherited from Unix itself, under the name of DAC or 
Discretionary Access Control. Simply put, this is the privilege-
based system that allows the existence of multiple users and 
groups, allowing each access to files, system locations, and 
applications according to this ownership scheme. A system 
administrator (or superuser) can override these privileges 
however, posing a security risk.  
One of the main extensions to this basic schema is the usage 
of a cryptography API (Application Programming Interface) 
via a kernel module to allow further hardening of privileges 
throughout the system installation. Another enhancement is the 
usage of LSM or Linux Security Modules which further builds 
upon DAC and introduces an intermediate layer for applications 
to register through and receive callbacks from. This ensures a 
decoupled system is maintained between the user privileges and 
the application privileges at runtime via the implementation of 
isolation rules and policies. 
Two prominent and widely-used LSM implementations are 
SELinux and AppArmor. These are found in popular Linux 
distributions such as Fedora and Ubuntu Linux, commonly used 
throughout the IT infrastructure domain. Both of them have 
evolved over time to accommodate the ever-changing 
landscape of software applications while mitigating security 
risks and maintaining a strong capability with respect to 
virtualization environments, one of which is Docker. 
The main drawback of both these tools is their reliance on 
user-defined rules and policies. As such, the usability of the tool 
becomes immediately critical to the configuration of the system. 
Schreuders, McGill and Payne [3] have conducted an empirical 
study on this subject, introducing a graphical toolkit to aid 
administrators in the exploration and implementation of current 
SELinux policies using visualization. The study, although 
limited in scope, proved that visual aids enhanced the usability 
of SELinux as a whole and helped administrators identify 
policy violations. 
A similar study conducted by the same group of researchers 
the following year utilized a detailed comparison of SELinux, 
AppArmor and a third LSM implementation by the name of 
FBAC-LSM [4]. This comparison found that out of the three, 
FBAC-LSM was favored amongst participants due to the 
friendly user interface that by extension allowed better policy 
implementation and inspection. However, this security 
framework is no longer being utilized. 
B. Linux Features that Enable Docker 
Going further into the security measures implemented into 
the Linux kernel, there are two specific features that directly 
enable the existence of containers, such as Docker and LXC; 
these are: namespaces and control groups. 
Namespaces are used to isolate processes on several levels 
and provide the necessary mechanisms to orchestrate complex 
infrastructure. This is not restricted to containers and 
virtualization alone but can be used for other applications as 
well. There are currently six such isolation levels, or 
namespaces implemented:  
1. mnt (mount point, filesystem) 
2. pid (processes) 
3. net (network stack)  
4. ipc (system interrupt calls)  
5. uts (hostname) 
6. user (UIDs) 
 
By allocating a dedicated namespace (or several) to a process, 
a certain level of isolation, or sandboxing, is guaranteed. A 
container is essentially a process running on the host OS, and 
multiple containers can run in isolation using this method. 
While namespaces ensure isolation, control groups (usually 
called just cgroups) are responsible for resource management 
and provide the necessary mechanisms to programmatically 
allocate resources to a process. Through the use of a virtual file 
system (VFS), each cgroup can be assigned a limited number 
of resources by the administrator to (a) ensure they do not 
exceed available host resources and (b) not starve system 
resources for other applications. The resources are usually CPU, 
memory or network related, but there are hardware-oriented 
policies as well, such as a device control group that can restrict 
read/write access to physical devices. 
C. Docker Security 
Despite the facilities mentioned in the previous section, 
there are more implementation-specific details to be taken into 
consideration when evaluating the state of container security. 
One comprehensive study by Dua, Raja and Kakadia 
evaluated various container technologies from the scope of 
suitability in a PaaS (Product as a Service) environment, while 
also comparing them to existing virtualization technologies, 
such as Xen and KVM [5]. A high-level comparison is provided 
in Table 1. When compared with traditional virtualization 
options, containers have several advantages, mainly in terms of 
performance and overall manageability. On the security front, 
all types of containers can benefit from Mandatory Access 
Control on the host OS via tools such as SELinux and 
AppArmor as mentioned in the previous section. 
 
Table 1. VM and Container Feature Comparison from [3] 
Parameter Virtual Machines Containers 
Guest OS Each VM runs on virtual 
hardware and Kernel is loaded 
into its own memory region 
All the guests share the 
same OS and Kernel. 
The kernel image is 
loaded into the physical 
memory 
Communication Occurs through Ethernet 
Devices 
Standard IPC 
mechanisms like signals, 
pipes, and sockets. 
Security Depends on the implementation 
of Hypervisor 
Mandatory access 
control can be leveraged 
Performance Virtual Machines suffer from a 
small overhead since the 
machine instructions and 
translated from the Guest to the 
Host OS 
Containers provide near-
native performance 
compared to the 
underlying Host OS 
Isolation Sharing libraries and files 
between guests and guest hosts 
are not possible 
Subdirectories can be 
transparently mounted 
and can be shared 
Startup time VM’s take several minutes to 
boot up 
Containers can be started 
in several seconds since 
the host OS is already 
running 
Storage Vm’s take more storage since 
the OS kernel and its associated 
programs have to be installed, 
stored, and executed 
Containers take a lower 
amount of storage since 
the base OS is shared 
 
Docker specifically builds upon LXC (Linux Containers), a 
lightweight kernel container implementation. Additionally, it 
leverages the same aforementioned Linux mechanisms, 
namespaces and cgroups, while also aiming to resolve two 
more issues: (a) mapping the root user of the container to the 
non-root user of Docker instance, and (b) allowing the Docker 
daemon to run as a non-root user. Table 2 illustrates the 
differences between Docker and LXC, as well as two other 
popular container technologies. 
 
Table 2. Container Implementation Comparison from [5] 
Parameter LXC Warden Docker OpenVZ 
Process 
Isolation 
Uses pid 
namespaces 
Uses pid 
namespaces 
Uses pid 
namespaces 
Uses pid 
namespaces 
Resource 
Isolation 
Uses cgroups Uses cgroups Uses cgroups Uses cgroups 
Network 
Isolation 
Uses net 
namespaces 
Uses net 
namespaces 
Uses net 
namespaces 
Uses net 
namespaces 
Filesystem 
Isolation 
Uses chroot Uses Overlay 
file system 
with 
overlayfs 
Uses chroot Uses chroot 
Container 
Lifecycle 
Tools, lcx-
create, lcx-
stop,lcx start, 
to create start 
and stop 
containers 
Containers 
are managed 
but running 
commands 
on a warden 
client and 
warden 
server 
Uses Docker 
daemon and a 
client to 
manage 
containers 
Uses vzctl to 
manage 
container 
lifecycle 
 
In fact, resource isolation mechanisms are the same as 
discussed in the previous section (cgroups), and the various 
containers only differ in the Filesystem Isolation and Container 
Lifecycle categories. These are implementation specific details 
that provide the abstraction layers needed for each container 
and are depicted in Figure 1. This graph shows the reliance of 
Docker to LXC and the container specific changes including the 
UnionFS and Image portions. The topic of a Docker image is 
of particular interest from a security perspective and is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
III. DOCKER IMAGE SECURITY & METRICS 
One important aspect of how Docker images are composed 
involves the regulation and creation of Docker Images. 
Essentially, these image files are generated based on a set of 
instructions provided to the Docker Engine. Together, the 
creation of an image and all of the aspects in which it runs 
contributes to interesting metrics that can also involve 
malicious or outdated images. Additionally, common 
frameworks such as CVE (Common Vulnerability Assessment) 
and tools like Docker Notary can be used to find these 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure 1. Comparing Various Containers from [5] 
Image files contain the needed code, configuration mapping, 
and packages that are needed to run an application [6]. 
Therefore, and based on any of these components, an image can 
be malicious or even house vulnerable packages that could have 
security implications. Currently, there are many different ways 
and tools to discover these items, but one topic of interest is 
static and dynamic analysis. 
A. Malicious/Vulnerable Images 
One important aspect of using images is where they are 
hosted. Similar to how code is hosted within GitHub, many 
developers register their images for reuse within Docker Hub. 
For example, if a .NET application is built with an image, then 
it is possible that another Docker Hub user may encounter the 
same scenario and want to reuse the image, only changing or 
adding the specific configurations/code needed for his or her 
application. This new method encourages reusability and file 
sharing [6]. However, this means that these images are 
developed independently and then trafficked out by a litany of 
organizations. Therefore, the image file can turn into a 
dependency that raises concerns [6]. Acknowledging that this 
is a problem, even architects at Docker are encouraging 
developers and image composers to assume that all of these 
distributed pipelines are “actively malicious” [6][7]. 
To combat this issue, Docker has introduced a utility known 
as Notary which is used to safely publish key content over a 
distributed network [7].  To do this, it relies on the following 
metrics in the left column of Table 3 in comparison to those 
from Brady [6] on the right. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Brady et. al and Winkle Analysis services from 
[6][8] 
Winkle Analysis [8] Brady et. al Analysis [6] 
Survivable Key Compromise CVE Analysis 
Freshness Guarantee Dynamic Analysis 
Configurable Trust Thresholds Static Analysis 
Single delegation Port Scans 
Existing Distribution Process Monitoring 
Untrusted mirrors and transport  
This framework allows for the creation of a content trust 
network that can be enabled in a container registry. With 
integration to a Docker Trust Server, one can use the Notary 
tool to pull, push, and sign images [6]. What this ensures is that 
if there is any tampering or modifications to the trusted image, 
then the Notary service will be able to report the malicious item 
during the scan and verification. 
Malicious images can be detected using vulnerability 
assessment and virus tools [18]. Additionally, these malicious 
images frequently use bash scripts to establish a Secure Shell 
Tunnel (SSH) to report back to a central network [6]. To 
prevent this, a Docker in Docker analysis can be used to capture 
metrics relevant to this such as networking, CPU, and memory 
statistics. This approach is known as dynamic analysis. 
B. Dynamic Analysis & CVE 
In comparison to using tools built into Docker, dynamic 
analysis observes how the container and image behave while 
the instance is executing [6]. While dynamic analysis takes 
more time than static analysis, it can provide better and more 
actionable results [6]. 
In the paper “Docker Container Security in Cloud 
Computing,” Brandy et. al achieved a static and dynamic 
analysis pipeline leveraged against Docker images by 
combining an API that uses the tool CoreOS Clair and 
VirusTotal to scan against CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures) [6]. See Figure 3 that shows how the image is 
loaded into the API and uses the two tools to output results. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Dynamic & Static Analysis Scan Using Clair and VirusTotal from 
Brandy et. al [6].  
While Clair provides a static analysis (more on this in the 
next section) screening, virus scanning tools such as VirusTotal 
perform static analysis via signature checks and they also run 
dynamic analysis within emulators [6]. This method relies on 
three different metrics: 
 
1. Network analysis 
a. Packet capture 
b. Connection time alive amount 
c. Open ports 
2. File system changes 
a. Changes to image 
b. New binaries 
3. CPU statistics 
a. RAM consumption 
b. CPU usage 
 
One additional type of dynamic analysis mentioned by 
Brandy et al. [6] is the use of Shodan to scan inbound/outbound 
IP ranges to determine whether the connection originates from 
an SSH or TOR daemon. Additionally, this tool can report open 
ports and services running. In summary, dynamic analysis 
requires more resources and evaluation since it runs during the 
program execution compared to doing static analysis before 
publishing an image. However, it is excellent for providing 
actionable results based on relevant image metrics. 
C. Static Analysis 
Static analysis of a Docker image involves checking the 
image while it is at rest to ensure that vulnerabilities or security 
issues are detected before the image is running. Figure 4 shows 
an example of this from Brandy et. al where image analysis is 
performed at rest before pushing to a Docker Registry. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Static Analysis Workflow for Docker Security Metrics from Brandy 
et. al [6]. 
CVE is essentially a framework and data log that assists in 
this static analysis workflow. It provides an extensive catalog 
of key known vulnerabilities. Included in this report is a list of 
comprehensive analysis of known vulnerabilities along with 
their severity scores and impact information [7]. This is crucial 
to Docker because it creates an actionable reference point for 
static analysis. Additionally, it was found that if a vulnerability 
within a Docker image was detected, then it was more likely 
that action would be taken to address it [9]. 
 
Table 4. Clair CVE Metric Categories from [6][7] 
Category Severity Level  
Unknown 0 
Negligible 1 
Low 2 
Medium 3 
High 4 
Critical 5 
Defcon1 6 
Brandy et al. utilized CoreOS Clair and VirusTotal within 
the first and second layers of their static analysis scan to extract 
the needed results. Clair is able to categorize the known CVE's 
into seven different metrics as shown in Table 4. 
Brandy et al. [6] then use static analysis in their CI/CD 
pipelines to determine how malicious an image is by 
aggregating two values: a threshold based on the above severity 
level, and a vulnerability count. For an image to pass the metric 
scan, an image will be approved if and only if there were less 
than 50 vulnerabilities of severity 4 or category “High” [6]. In 
comparison, this type of CVE analysis aligns with works 
completed by Zerouali et al. [10] who found that “users who are 
more concerned by image security focused on scanning for 
simple Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE).” 
Finally, the following list identifies the metrics that Brandy et 
al. identified in relation to static analysis [6]: 
 
• Code issues 
o Number of source code bugs 
o Lines of unreachable code 
o Number of undefined variables 
o Amount of variable misuse 
o Numbed of uncalled functions 
o Amount of improper memory usage 
o Number of out of bounds exceptions 
• File issues 
o Signature based file names 
o Hashes on files 
o Malicious file types  
 
The combination of these metrics provides the basis for 
observing and determining the vulnerabilities contained within 
an image using static analysis. 
D. Outdated Images 
In comparison to static analysis, Zerouali et al. [10] 
reviewed and performed a combination of static and dynamic 
analysis for outdated packages in the paper “On the Relation 
between Outdated Docker Containers, Severity, Vulnerabilities 
and Bugs.” Zeriouali and the authors describe that Docker Hub 
hosts over 1.5 million images in its repositories. These 
repositories usually house both open-sourced and community 
certified images from regular vendors [10]. However, instead 
of looking for images that have been maliciously impacted, 
Zerouali et al. look into how an old version of an image may 
have outdated packages that contain security vulnerabilities and 
bugs that impact the image [10]. Even though the code may be 
updated, if the image of the Docker container is not, then it is 
possible that a production image would have bugs and flaws 
that could compromise security.  
Zerouali et al.  also focused on Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) ratings and found that in a similar fashion to 
Brandy et al., users who are concerned about vulnerabilities 
apply efforts to comparing vulnerabilities on the CVE list 
[10][6]. This backs up some of the supporting claims from 
Brandy et al., but fundamentally Zerouali et al. focused on 
different research questions. See Table 5 for the full list of 
research questions posed by Zerouali et al. 
Table 5. Zerouali et al. Research Questions from [10] 
Question Number Question 
RQ0 “How often are Docker images updated?” 
RQ1 “How outdated are container packages?” 
RQ2 “How vulnerable are container packages?” 
RQ3 “To which extent do containers suffer from 
bus in packages?” 
RQ4 “How long do bugs and security 
vulnerabilities remain unfixed?” 
 
Zerouali et al. are able to extract the needed information to 
answer the above research questions using the below method in 
Figure 5.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Zerouali et al. Outdated Image Analysis Diagram [10] 
This method relies on scanning Docker images to assess the 
package, vulnerability, and bug reports for further analysis. 
Specifically, the tool “Debian Security Bug Tracker” is used. 
This tool is a managed bug defect list that combines CVE data 
and can be cross correlated with images pushed to the scanned 
container [6]. Additionally, Zerouali et al. utilized the following 
outputs from the Debian report to summarize their analysis [10]: 
 
• Affected source packages 
• Vulnerability Severity 
• Vulnerability Status 
• Package Version 
• Debian Bug ID 
• Affected Debian Distribution 
 
Zerouali et al. also found that “more than half of the scanned 
Docker images had not been updated for four months” [10]. In 
regard to RQ1, it was found that one out of every five packages 
installed from a Docker image is outdated [10]. Zerouali et al. 
also determined the proportions of vulnerabilities within image 
packages. It was determined that while medium and high 
vulnerabilities had the highest percent of resolved cases, all 
levels of vulnerability contained a percentage of open issues 
[10]. 
From this finding, it was hypothesized that images or 
containers with a higher number of outdated packages would, 
therefore, have a higher amount of vulnerabilities. Zerouali et 
al. found a positive correlation between the number of outdated 
packages and the total located vulnerabilities across multiple 
versions of Debian. Additionally, older versions correlated with 
a higher vulnerability count [10]. 
With these findings, Zerouali et al. were able to conclude 
that nearly half of all vulnerabilities are not being fixed, and 
furthermore, many containers have high severity issues [10]. In 
summary, it provides insight into known Docker security 
pattern analysis by laying a groundwork to bridge CVE 
correlation with outdated images and metrics. 
IV. DOCKER THREATS AND ATTACKS 
Docker contains different types of potential attacks that can 
cause critical data dissemination occurring primarily between 
Docker to Docker or Container to Container communications. 
This section will cover the threat model metrics and channel 
attacks as proposed by Yang Luo et al. [11] along with a graph-
based anomaly detection system as described by Chengzhi Lu 
et al. [12]. 
A. Threat Model 
Luo et al. identified the container threat models that are 
officially documented paths for intra-container communication. 
These paths are important because they define key metrics that 
directly correlate to the security of a Docker container and the 
functionality it encapsulates and permits [11]. Refer to Table 6 
for the three different types of documented container-container 
communication pathways: 
 
 Table 6. Container to Container Official Communication Paths from [11] 
Collocated Container 
Communication Type 
Area of Application 
Storage Path Mapping Supplied with collocated container 
storage mounting. 
Port Mapping Network intra-communications 
Layer-2 Connection Virtual intra-container network bridge 
 
Storage path mapping communication allows for additional 
arguments to be passed to the container. When allowed, this file 
path is mapped as storage to be supplied to the host operating 
system and it is then mapped between the two containers [11]. 
Port Mapping allows for a mapping of a certain port or ports 
from one container to another through an underlying TCP or 
UDP connection [11]. Finally, Luo et al. identified that a Layer-
2 connection is possible if a Layer-2 network connection via a 
virtual bridge is enabled or established.  
Knowing this, Luo et al. proposed that if these 
communication types are not properly understood, then it 
would be possible to retrieve secrets or protected information 
from one container through a collocated container. Figure 6 
shows this process where a malicious resource through the 
internet could access Container B, go through the Docker and 
OS Channel through the previously mentioned communication 
models, and then retrieve access to Container A’s secret 
information. 
 
 
Figure 6. Threat model utilizing channel attack between Docker containers 
from [11] 
This information is crucial because there is an opportunity 
to observe the potential types of threats presented in the model 
Luo et al. established by investigating the metrics in these 
channels of attack. 
B. Channel Attacks 
Since containers all run on the same machine, they 
obviously share a significant amount of hardware resources like 
CPU utilization and memory. With this in mind, and since 
containers can view the changes in memory usage per process 
and container, Luo et al. identified this as one crucial metric to 
analyze known as “hardware occupancy channels” [11]. 
Another option that relates to file system mapping is to identify 
the disk operations on the mounted hosts shared between the 
two containers. This structure is mounted on both containers 
and shared as a filesystem from the physical host [11]. Because 
of this relation, Luo et al. proposed that the used size of the 
shared disk can be observed to monitor for process changes in 
“non-privileged containers.”  
Another type of channel attack mentioned by Luo et al. is 
the KMB (Kernel Message Buffer) Channel and Information 
Leak attack. This attack involves utilizing and gaining access 
to kernel-level messages that are sensitive to the machine. With 
this type of attack, Luo et al. identified the following metrics 
can be gained maliciously [11]: 
 
• CPU details 
• Linux Kernel Version 
• BIOS information 
• Hypervisor version 
• Memory information 
• Systemd daemon running status 
• Security modules 
• Bluetooth and network adapter details 
 
In order to prevent these attacks, Luo et al. identify that 
these attack services can be resolved if the “full” privilege mode 
parameter is not utilized. This will decrease the attack surface 
of the container by reducing the number of potential attack 
channels from 37 to 14 [11]. Luo et al. identified that these 
remaining 14 capabilities are granted by default and they are 
listed below in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Container to Container Official Communication Paths from [11] 
 
Group Isolated? Capabilities 
System (1/9) No CAP_AUDIT_WRITE 
File Related (7/11) Yes CAP_CHOWN, 
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, 
CAP_FOWNER, CAP_FSETID, 
CAP_MKNOD, 
CAP_SYS_CHROOT, 
CAP_SETFCAP 
Process Related (4/6) Yes CAP_KILL, CAP_SETGID, 
CAP_SETUID, CAP_SETCAP 
Network Related 
(2/3) 
Yes CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 
 
In conclusion, Luo et al. found that the management of these 
capabilities along with monitoring the KMB and utilizing a 
security policy are key factors in adhering to a reduction 
application attack surface [11]. 
C. Graph Based Anomaly Detection  
In comparison to the analysis by Luo et al., Lu et al. have 
determined a “novel graph-based anomaly detection” system 
that can avoid using traditional detection methods to locate 
system vulnerabilities and issues. Lu et al. mention that most 
other Docker security scanning tools or methods rely on the 
following metrics to determine if a container is acting in an 
anomalous state: 
 
• CPU usage 
• Memory usage 
• Network input/output rates 
 
However, and due to the common nature of n-tiered 
applications, these metrics can be unreliable and cause false 
positives [12]. This is because such systems may behave in 
dynamic manners and this can lead to results or readings that 
look like security anomalies, when in fact they represent normal 
system behavior (e.g. spikes in CPU usage based on business 
strategies). In comparison to the analysis by Luo et al and others, 
Lu et al. utilize an edge weight system state graph that 
represents the multiple tiers of the application. This allows for 
multiple components of a system to be represented based on 
functionality and average system utilization or role. 
Furthermore, the system relies mostly on anticipated 
component response time between the different nodes of the 
system. See Figure 7 for the request time analysis of a normal 
three-tiered application. 
 
 
Figure 7. Threat model utilizing channel attack between Docker containers 
from [12] 
Here the total response time is defined as [12]: 	
CRTA=CRTB+NTABreq+NTABres+PTAreq+PTAres 
 
Where these values coordinate with the following values in 
Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Three-tier application Response Time Definitions from [12] 
 
Value Definition 
CRTA Total response time for component A 
CRTB Total response time for component B 
NTABreq Request time between component A 
and component B 
NTABres Response time between component A 
and component B 
PTAreq Component A request processing time 
PTAres Component A processing response 
time 
 
From here, it can be extrapolated that each component will have 
a weight difference based on the calculated Euclidian distances 
between the edges. Based on these weight differences, the 
response time and graph similarity can be compared over time 
and is represented in a stable system. Lu determined that when 
plotted, the graph similarity of these components across a 
sample point stays approximately straight. 
Additionally, Lu et al. tested the system with a CPU, 
memory, and network anomaly. The result was that the 
response time of the nodes in all three scenarios demonstrated 
a change in graph similarity. Lu simulated this scenario with a 
CPU anomaly that mimicked a large jump in processor 
utilization. Unlike the previously stable system, this system 
tracked a large disturbance in the graph similarity around the 
sample point of the CPU anomaly. 
In summary, Lu et al. were able to create a system that relies 
on abstracting system components within a tiered application 
summarized by response time. This weighted graph system is 
able to better expose problems and anomalies in application 
components by uniquely utilizing security metrics, algorithms, 
and Euclidian graphs to be effective with a precision of up to 
0.9 [12]. 
V. SECURITY AUTOMATION & BEST PRACTICES 
Containers are quickly taking over virtual machines. Some 
key reasons why container popularity is growing is because 
they are lightweight, portable, and ship faster [13]. However, 
the advantages of using containers come with vulnerabilities 
that are non-issues in virtual machines. In this section, the 
challenges associated with containers, security tools available 
to address and monitor these issues, and best practices to 
increase security are explored. 
A. Challenges 
The transition from virtual machines to Docker containers 
comes with a host of benefits. However, the advantages of using 
containers also pose its own set of challenges when it comes to 
security. For instance, containers have a unique surface of 
attack compared but not unrelated to their VM counterparts. 
One reason is due to the fact that containers run on top of the 
host operation system, which they are tightly coupled to [14]. 
As a result, compromises within the container mean that 
attackers can gain access to the host OS and other local 
resources. Docker recent gain in popularity also means that 
third-party integrations and solutions are continuing to become 
available. As such, containers can be susceptible to malware 
and other vulnerabilities as mentioned in a previous section 
[6][13]. Finally, vulnerabilities come in their own deployment 
systems. For instance, one of the key benefits of Docker is the 
ability to deploy multiple application containers from a single 
service. However, even this has challenges due to the difficulty 
of managing several containers on a single service [13].  
B. Security Tools 
A variety of tools are available for monitoring and 
increasing container security. One such tool is Docker Swarm. 
This system acts as a cluster and orchestration tool that handles 
automatic deployment and the detection of failed containers. 
Additionally, the tool includes a manager node that orchestrates 
and delegates processes to a worker node or nodes, which in 
turn runs the swarm services. The process is such that requests 
are distributed equally to the workers via the manager node [13].  
Furthermore, Docker Swarm does have limitations when it 
comes to resource utilization related to hosting machines. For 
instance, Docker Swarm does not have the ability to directly 
monitor the resources on host machines, which can lead to 
imbalances on the host [13]. 
One method used for monitoring memory utilization is 
through the installation of scripts [13]. Scripts serve several 
purposes, such as recording memory usage of worker nodes and 
sending collected data to the manager node for analysis which 
can trigger the manager mode to make modifications to the 
configuration. However, writing scripts for each Docker Swarm 
can be cumbersome and inefficient due to the management 
nature associated with them.  
Beyond writing and installing scripts, a different tool called 
Docker-sec, presents a more automated solution. Docker-sec 
works in combination with AppAmor, mentioned in the Docker 
Security Overview, by attaching security profiles to critical 
components. Docker-sec uses a two-pronged system for 
container security. The first part of the system is the static 
analysis, which is covered in detail in the section on Container 
Security & Metrics. In Docker-sec, the static analysis works 
with the security already built into containers by retrieving the 
initial rules that have placed restrictions on the components that 
containers can access. The next step requires Docker-sec to go 
through a training routine utilizing the dynamic monitoring 
mechanism. A user configures the dynamic monitoring 
mechanism to collect data on a container about detailed 
behavior over a specified time period. Once the data collection 
period has finished, Docker-sec analyzes the data and creates 
rules to manage the container profile and heighten the security. 
Figure 8 models the training process for a container runtime 
profile [15]. 
 
Figure 8. Training process for a container runtime profile [13] 
 
Table 9. Popular Container Security Tools [12] 
 
Tool Key Features 
AppArmor Container security access profiler that generates 
and enforces access control security. 
AquaSec Provides static analysis scans for vulnerabilities 
and security issues along with image policy 
enforcement and configuration management. 
Clair Integrates CVE analysis against container 
implementations 
Docker Notary Docker tool for the verification of image security 
using cryptographic signatures.   
Docker-sec Protects Docker containers through access policies 
and comparing activity with expected activity. 
Docker Swarm Container orchestration tool with container state 
management and monitoring abilities managed 
through the Docker Engine. 
Sysdig Debugging and insight tool for investigating 
container metrics including process, thread, and 
memory information. 
 
The enhanced container profile is implemented through the 
use of AppArmor in two modes. The first is enforce mode. 
Enforce mode establishes strict protocols, restricting the 
execution of any components which violate the profile rules. 
The other option is complain mode. Complain mode allows for 
executions but records the violations. The use of enforce and 
complain mode are not exclusive. Some profile rules can be 
strictly enforced while logging specific violations [15] are not 
exclusive. Some profile rules can be strictly enforced while 
logging specific violations [15]. A comparison of some of the 
more popular Docker security tools and their key yet 
distinguishing features are compared in Table 9. 
 
C. Security Policies 
Developers can follow several security policies to maintain 
and increase the level of security for Docker containers, starting 
with the architecture. Many of the security implications of key 
interest in relation to Docker are tied to its layered architecture. 
Docker architecture begins with the host machine. The next 
layer which is known as the Docker daemon or dockerd is 
installed on the host machine. The daemon processes and 
manages Docker containers, the self-contained environments 
that run images. The last layer is the Docker Client, which is 
the user interface. The Docker Client acts as a buffer between 
the user and the host machine. As a result, the user does not 
interface directly with the daemon, offering a layer of security 
[14]. 
To maintain the built-in security, developers utilize the 
automatically created namespaces and control groups (cgroups), 
allowing containers to remain isolated from one another. Next, 
cgroups can be used to manage container resources. This 
prevents containers from overusing or draining resources from 
other containers. Restricting access to the network and host is 
also important. Only the Docker Daemon should connect to the 
host, ensuring and enforcing the security buffer. Along with this 
buffer, containers should rarely have access to the root. When 
containers do have access to the root, privileges should be 
limited and scoped. In lieu of providing access or working from 
within root, containers can be given access to a virtual root [14]. 
Developers should also use third-party containers with 
caution. Security vulnerabilities can be coded (maliciously or 
unintentionally) into third-party containers, which can leave 
systems open to attack [16]. One often neglected item that 
comes with using third-party containers is in reference to the 
resource/package version. As mentioned in the previous section, 
outdated images pose significant vulnerabilities and most third-
party images are outdated [6]. By using containers that are 
maintained, as well as keeping containers up to date, developers 
[17] can increase application integrity since updated containers 
are often equipped to handle the most recent security 
vulnerabilities or patches. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the containerization of applications with 
Docker is becoming a more popular strategy within the world 
of software development. With this in mind, the new landscape 
provides a unique level of attack surface which can be 
categorized by metrics key to Docker and the way in which it 
functions. A prime feature of containers is the images used to 
store and deploy applications, which utilize a GNU/Linux 
kernel. This results in the containers inheriting the built-in 
security protections or issues that come with the Linux kernel. 
Additional security features are available through the host 
operating system which has the capability of implementing 
Mandatory Access Controls. However, this built-in Linux and 
container security does not eliminate all the vulnerability 
concerns that come with using Docker. Specifically, this new 
application structure is susceptible to issues such as malicious 
or vulnerable images associated with third-party sharing. In fact, 
many of the available third-party containers have unaddressed 
security issues which are rated as high severity.  
Additional security concerns arise from collocated 
containers that create access risks to other containers which can 
be identified by various detection scenarios and metrics. 
Containers are also vulnerable to various types of channel 
attacks such as those related to shared resources and leaks. 
Fortunately, many of the security challenges can be addressed 
or at least monitored through the use of the aforementioned 
utilities, metrics, and tools. Above all, Dockers unique 
architectural pattern provides an interesting security challenge 
that involves every layer of the infrastructure from image to 
container and generates innovative ways to collect and analyze 
metrics associated with the platform. 
Based on the findings above, and the importance of Docker 
security metrics driven by the rapid adoption of containerized 
landscapes, several future research directions have been 
identified. Specifically, an advancement in the anomaly 
detection methods between the container and the host operating 
system would prove beneficial. Additionally, increased insight 
into adapting CVSS scoring alongside vulnerabilities 
specifically effecting containers could change the methods in 
which this system scores vulnerability severities. Finally, 
additional research initiatives investigating the level of Docker 
security education and training of enterprise architects, 
developers, and security experts against the rate of Docker 
security incidents could illuminate key methods for future 
incident prevention. 
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